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THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY
TO ENFORCE CHARITABLE USES.
(CONCLUDED.)
The law of charities considered in reference topersonalproperty.-
Some peculiarities in reference to charitable uses in personal pro-
perty have been reserved for a separate discussion. If chattels
,are devoted to charity by gifts inter vivo8, no reason is perceived
why the law of charitable trusts should not be fully applicable. A
difficult question arises when a gift is made by testament.
I. To obtain a clear view of this question, an examination should
be had in respect to the disposition of the effects of intestates.
There can be no doubt that the bishop or ordinary from an early
date had the control of personal assets where the owner died
intestate, for the purpose of applying them to pious uses. What
was the precise origin of his power is not entirely clear. Some
very respectable authorities regard it as a branch of the royal
prerogative-the right to take such goods as had no owner (bona
vacantia) ; others of great weight, among whom is Selden, discard
this idea. However this may be, it is believed, that, as far as
administrators were concerned, the question became unimportant
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after the statute of 31 Edward III., c. 11. This act expressly
requires administrators, as deputies of the ordinary, after satisfying
debts, to dispend the personal property for the soul of the de-
ceased.' It is said in Theloall's Digest (written A.D. 1579) that
the object of this statute was to enable administrators to sue in the
king's courts. They had previously been appointed by the bishop,
but could not bring actions. Their duties were now assimilated to
those of executors. 2  Their conduct became from this time, at least,
subject to the supervision of the superior courts, and their duty to
dispend for the soul was even recognised in the common law
tribunals. The language of the statute appears to refer to an
already existing practice. As between two creditors, it was
deemed a breach of duty to pay a debt before it was due, rather
than one already due. An injury was done "t to the soul of the
deceased," and they might be compelled to repay the money from
their own estate.
3
These views are confirmed by the fact that administration must
have been committed in such a manner that the administrator
could dispend for the soul of the deceased; otherwise he was not,
in view of the courts of law, "c administrator," but only a servant
of the ordinary. The form of such a limited appointment is given
in the case cited in the note, and is perhaps the earliest extant.
4
IHe would now be termed "c a collector." The proposition in this
case undoubtedly means that an appointee with such qualified
powers was in the same position in which an administrator would
have been before the statute of Edward III., and bound to account
only to the ordinary. Where the statute was not complied with,
the ordinary himself was administrator and was responsible in -the
1 Yet Lord Eldon, in Moggridge vs. Thackwell, mentions it as a singular fact,
that the ordinary, of his own accord, had determined to apply a portion of the
personal estate of every intestate to charity. This statute had evidently escaped
his notice. Blackstone, in alluding to the statute 31 Ed. III., does not mention
this clause. 2d Book of Commentaries, p. 496.
2 Theloall cites 19 E. III., 20 and 24. His Digest is bound with the "Register
of Writs."
3 Year Book, 9 Ed. IV., 13.
4 Year Book, 16 Ed. IV., 1, case 4.
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superior courts as such.' The duty of the administrator to dispend
for the soul was similar to that of an executor who held a residue
not disposed of by the will. This was termed a " general trust."'
A gift in general terms to an executor to ,, dispend for the soul"
was inoperative because he was previously and by force of his
office under an obligation to expend the money in that manner.
This was so held at common law.3 A residuary gift to him
expressly to his own use was valid, but if the general words "to
pay the debts and to expend for the soul" were added, the legacy
was not beneficial but a general trust. The court remarked that
all works of charity were within the intent.
4
There was no reason why the Court of Chancery should not
enforce these general trusts. An administrator's duty could not
be enforced in the ecclesiastical Court, for by the grant of ad-
ministration the ecclesiastical authority was gone.- It was well
settled at an early period that an executor in respect to debts held
the personal property as a trustee, though no specific direction to
pay debts was given to him. He was compelled by the process
of a Court of Chancery to pay them.6 The ground of this rule
was that the obligation bound his conscience, as he had no right to
receive the assets, except as he took them with the just charges to
which they were liable. No reason is apparent why the same
view should not be taken of the obligation to "c expend for the
soul." Both duties are named in the statute of Edward III.;
both are coupled together in the wills of that day; both are
termed, in the early authorities, general trusts. The striking fact
that the payment of debts and the appropriation of property to
charitable purposes are everywhere spoken of together, is well
explained in the statute of Henry V., previously cited. The
fulfilment of each of these duties was equally advantageous to the
soul of the testator. The result is that, in the absence of specific
I Year Book, 11 H. IV., 73; stat. 13 Ed. I. c. 19.
2 Cary's Reports, p. 28.
3 Year Book, 21 Ed. IV., 6, case 15.
4 Hancks vs. Alborough, (C. B.), Sir F. Moore R. 764.
5 2 Bla. Comm. 515; Williams' Ex. 1169; 1 Spence Eq. Jur. 679.
6 1 Spence's Equitable Jurisdiction of Court of Chancery, pp. 191 and 192.
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directions by the decedent, the duties of personal representatives
were the same in respect to debts and charities; and that they
could have equally been enforced in Chancery except from the
technical difficulty, in the case of charity, of naming a plaintiff.
The duty of the administrator rested upon the statute ; that of the
executor who held a residue, reposed upon general principles
of law.
It may be urged in opposition to this view that no authorities
can be found to sustain it. If this were admitted, it would not be
decisive. We can in these remote periods only look for fragments
and shreds of proof. There were no Chancery reports, and as
Mr. Spence justly remarks, equity jurisprudence could not pos-
sibly have been so poor and jejune as would be inferred simply
from the reported cases. There is however some proof on the
subject. When the statutes of Elizabeth were passed, the ordinary
was expressly excepted and retained the same power as before.
Still he could be charged in respect to charitable uses by the
commissioners until an administrator was appointed, and must be
summoned in such a case to attend the hearing.' From what
source was this power derived? Manifestly not from the statute.
It is believed to have originated in this manner. The ordinary's
own duty to pay debts was enforced by statute, and where no
administrator was selected he was certainly liable to that extent
in the common law courts. He therefore held like an executor
under a general trust which was ultimately extended to the residue
held for the soul of the deceased. It having been shown previously
that the commissioners exercised no new jurisdiction, the inference
is that the Court of Chancery could have enforced the application
of intestates' estates to charitable purposes before the statutes
of Elizabeth.
II. We may now regard the case of executors and the 8ubject
of legacies. It will only be necessary to discuss the question
when a legacy was given by the testator. The duty of an executor
in respect to a residue not disposed of in the will has been suffi-
ciently noticed. The trust of the executor in such a case, it is
clear, did not depend upon any statute.
' Duke on Charitable Uses, 185 and 152.
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It is not to be disputed that the ordinary had jurisdiction over
legacies of personal property. The principles of the Roman law
were largely adopted and amplified in the ecclesiastical courts.
Great favor was shown to legacies given to pious uses. It is not
our purpose to state the results attained in these tribunals. -The
authorities named in the note amply and learpedly illustrate them.'
It is only designed to show that no " plain, adequate and complete
remedy" could be had in these courts, and that, therefore, Chan-
cery, in accordance with the ordinary rule which guided its action,
was induced to entertain jurisdiction.
The power which the ordinary possessed to carry his decrees
into effect was that of excommunication. Stringent as this remedy
was, it was indirect, while that of the Court of Chancery was
direct, and the recusant could be confined in prison until he
obeyed the decree. Thus, in Owen's Reports, it is stated that
the MAaster of the Rolls said " that when executors had goods of a
testator to dispose of to pious uses, their power is subject to the
controlment of the ordinary, and he may make distribution of them
to pious uses. It was said at the bar that the ordinary might
make the executor's account before him, and might punish them
according to the law of the church if they spoil the goods, but
cannot compel them to employ them to pious uses." 2
The following additional reasons for the belief that the Court
of Chancery actually exercised jurisdiction, are submitted.
1. The Court must have been appealed to for the purpose of
discovery. When the statute for the distribution of intestates'
estates was passed, it was argued to the Lord Keeper that the
distribution could only be enforced in the ecclesiastical court. He
summarily disposed of the objection with the contemptuous remark
that the probate court had but "a lame jurisdiction. ' 3  This
"lameness" was equally apparent in the case of legacies. Some
authorities take the ground that the jurisdiction of Chancery in
I Swinburne on Wills; Mr. Noyes' argument in Beekman vs. Bonsor; lIr. Brad-
ford's argument in Rose vs. Rose. See the concluding note to this article.
2 P. 33, 40 Eliz.
3 Matthews vs. Newby, 1 Vernon 133 (1682).
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the case of legacies first attached for the purpose of discovering
assets, and that upon usual principles the court retained jurisdic-
tion with the object of enforcing the legacy., So in an old case,
it is given by counsel as a reason why a monk could be executor,
that 'he holds for the use of another, and may be compelled to give
testimony in O' ancery.2 It is well known that a monk was
regarded as civilly dead, and could not be party to an action in
the ordinary tribunals. This statement was made a hundred years
before the statutes of Elizabeth, and was not disputed. It is not
conceivable that it should have been made if the jurisdiction had
never been exercised.
It is entirely clear that bills of discovery in respect to legacies
were entertained before the year 1600. Thus in West's Symbol-
eography, written in 1594, there is given at full length the form
of a bill in Chancery to compel executors to pay legacies. It is
addressed to Sir Nicholas Bacon, and alleges as a reason why
Chancery should entertain jurisdiction, that the plaintiffs are not
acquainted with the assets which the executors had collected, and
that there was no adequate remedy in the ecclesiastical court. If
this form was taken, as is altogether probable, from a bill actually
used, it must have been filed before 1579, as Sir Nicholas Bacon
died in that year.3
2. It is altogether probable that application was made to the
Court of Chancery for the purpose of saving expense and delay.
The regular course of proceeding in the ecclesiastical court was to
appeal from the-ordinary's decision to the Pope at Rome. These
appeals were taken away in the reign of Henry VIII. No such
appeal could be taken from the king's courts. Suitors for .this
reason in the time of Henry VII. and Henry VIII. had recourse
to the Star Chamber for the recovery of legacies. 'Says an author
of repute, " Another sort of usual complaints in point of justice
was for matters testamentary, of which there are very many
I Keily vs. Monck, 3 Ridgway P. Cas. 243; Hurst vs. Beach, 5 Maddock 360;
Fielding vs. Bound, 1 Vernon 230.
2 Year Book, 12 H. V II., 28.
3 West's Symboleography or Precedents, part 2, 161 (Ed. 1601). Forms of
other bills against executors will be found in this book.
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examples. King Henry VII. heard a cause betwixt Haughton, a
saddler of London, and Barker, a goldsmith, and decreed to the
plaintiff two hundred marks, according to the intention of the will
of one Haughton, deceased. In Henry VIII.'s time it was also
usual, and the court gave order to have the testator's goods put in
safety to be inventoried as in Sessions case." I This interference,
according to the writer, was due to the frequency and expensive-
ness of appeals from the ordinary's decisions. This authority is
of great importance, as showing that the ecclesiastical court had
no such exclusive jurisdiction as to prevent other courts from
taking cognisance of testamentary matters. If the Star Chamber
was induced to interfere on account of a defect of justice and to
prevent a right of appeal to a foreign government, still more would
the Court of Chancery, whose office it was to give remedies of a
more adequate and complete character than could be obtained
elsewhere, relieve the suitor from the burden of frequent and
ruinous appeals. Says Mr. Spence, " the jurisdiction of Chancery
over executors and administrators appears to have gradually grown
up from its being found that there was no other tribunal capable
of doing effectual justice to all parties interested." 2
3. A more important reason why Chancery should enforce
legacies, was on account of the trust reposed in the executor by
the testator. This trust might be twofold. The chattels might
be given to the executor in trust to perform some act, or there
might be a legacy directly to some object without any gift to the
executor.
-First. If the gift was to the executor, what was called a special
trust was created as distinguished from the general trust where no
gift was made. 3 As such it could only be recogniscd in Chancery,
for the Spiritual Court could never enforce the execution of a
trust.4  Cases of this kind are to be found in the early reports.
Thus an executor compelled a co-executor to give sureties for the
12 Hargrave's Collectanea Juridica; (Treatise on Star Chamber) p. 56.
2 1 Spence Eq. Jur. 579, citing cases from the reign of H. VI. and Ed. IV.
3 Cary's Reports, p. 28.
4 Farrington vs. Knightly, 2 P. Wins. 548.
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performance of a trust in a will concerning money.1 Trust pro-
perty of a similar kind was followed into the hands of the execu-
tor's representatives. 2  So the Court, after entertaining jurisdiction
in respect to a legacy, granted an order to show cause why an
injunction should not be issued against a party who endeavored to
proceed in the ecclesiastical Court.3 As a general principle of
equity jurisprudence, it was well settled, that whenever the will
of the deceased was in danger of being frustrated, the Court would
make a decree not, only against the executor, but against all who
took with notice of the trust. Lord Keeper Egerton declared the
legacy in such a case to be both an express and implied trust, and
compared it to that of the assignment of a chattel in trust, where
the assignees were then compelled by the common course of the
Court to execute the trust.
4
These principles were applied to charities. Ioney could be
given for such uses as well as land. len were accustomed from
an early period to give money to their friends to deliver it to their
administrators to be expended for the good of their souls. Such
money was held in trust, so that the administrator could proceed
in Chancery to recover it. s Sometimes money was given by one
person to another to be disposed of after the donor's death for the
good of his soul. The donee became a "special executor," and
the money could not be recovered of him by the executors of the
will.6 Clearly he was a trustee over whom the ordinary had no
jurisdiction.
The calendars in Chancery show that charitable legacies to
executors were trusts and were established in that Court. The
cases of this kind will be noticed hereafter.
Second. The still more important question remains as to the
enforcement of legacies given to legatees other than the executor.
I Cotton vs. Cawston, Cary R. 113, 21 and 22 Elizabeth.
2 Wray vs. Sapcote, Cary R. 123, 21 and 22 Elizabeth.
3 Parre vs. Tiplady, Cary R. 104, 21 and 22 Elizabeth.
4 Sydnam vs. Courtney, in Chancery, Moore R. 567, 41 and 42 Elizabeth.
5 Year Book, 4 E. IV., p. 37.
6 Year Book, 8 E. IV., 5, per Needham, J.
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Mr. Spence is of the opinion that from the time of Charles I. and
probably earlier, jurisdiction was entertained in all cases of
legacies. The authorities already cited place the jurisdiction
before the year 1600. To these, the following may be added.
Suits in the ecclesiastical Court for legacies were stayed by
injunction in the fourth and thirty-second years of the reign of
Elizabeth.1  So where a legacy was given to a female if she
married with the consent of her friends and she married without
their assent, it was decreed to her.
2
Similar results were reached in the case of charities. Many
decisions of this kind are collected by Mr. Binney in the note to
VFidal vs. Girard. In some instances, the charities were of the
nature of foundations. In one case, the object of the suit was to
recover a legacy of £400 bequeathed for the purpose of producing
a yearly fund for the relief of the poor.3 In another, the object
was to recover a legacy which was directed to be invested at interest
for the poor.4  These suits were brought by one inhabitant of the
parish in behalf of himself and others, against the executors. In
some instances, where the money was given for the perpetual
benefit of the poor, the bill prayed that the Court would direct
the purchase of land for that purpose.5 One of these suits to
recover bequests of a charitable nature was instituted as early as
the fifteenth year of Queen Elizabeth.6 Charity legacies for the
poor were ordered to be paid in preference to others, on account
of equity and good conscience.7
A remarkable case from the Year Books illustrates the desire
of the early Chancellors to enforce charitable dispositions. An
executor was wasting the assets, and his co-executor commenced a
1 Cary vs. Mildmay, 32 Eliz. ; Denton vs. Biggot, 4 Eliz., cited in the Introduc-
tion to Praxis Almm Curiee Cancellarim, p. 40, 41.
2 Yelverton, contra, Newport, 36 Eliz.
3 Fytche et aL vs. Robinson, 1 Calendars in Chancery, 134, case 44.
4 Carlton vs. Blythe, 1 Calendars, 159, case 10; Mayor of Chester vs. Brooke, 1
Cal. 216, case 42.
s Sayer vs. Lambe, 1 Cal. 399, case 26.
6 Fisher vs. Phillipps, 3 Cal. 293, case 23.
7 1 Spence Eq. Jurisd. 387 (an. 1583).
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suit in Chancery against him. The Chancellor thought the case a
proper one for equitable relief. " Let no one," he said, " depart
from the Court of Chancery without a remedy." (Nullus recedat
a cancellaria sine remedio.) The counsel for the defendant
(Fineux) insisted if that maxim were true, there would be no need
of a confessor-and that this particular case belonged to the con-
fessor. The Chancellor replied that the law of the land should
agree with the law of God, and that such an executor who wasted
the goods would be " damned in hell." I He then rehearsed the
will, saying that the executor was directed to dispose of the goods
for the weal of the testator's soul, and that if he did not do it,
there was a good remedy in Chancery. He however expressed
his willingness to hear further argument. The case does not
appear to have been moved again. The fact that it was thought
worthy of being reported in the Year Books, where so few Chan-
cery decisions in comparison are found, shows that the case was
regarded as one of importance. It is remarkable that Fineux,
who, when Chief Justice, was notoriously no friend to the Court
of Chancery, did not raise the objection that the case was exclu-
sively cognisable in the Ecclesiastical Court, if such were the fact.
Instead of that, he contents himself with a feeble protest that the
matter was not judicially cognisable at all.'
This is an early application of the venerable maxim that Courts
of Chancery entertain jurisdiction where "a plain, adequate and
complete remedy" cannot be had in other Courts. It was made a
hundred years before the statutes of Elizabeth. Cases must have
continually arisen where this principle needed to be invoked. The
machinery of the Ecclesiastical Courts was -wholly inadequate to
provide the necessary relief. We have seen that it could not even
enforce the payment of simple contract debts.3 Much less would
I This style of argument was not infrequent with the Chancellors. So great a
man as Lord Ellesmere indulged in it a century later. He remarked in one case
that a usurer and broker might reckon together when they met in hell. Praxis
Almm Curioe Cancellarim, Introduction, p. 47.
2 Year Book, 4 H. VII. fol. 5.
3 1 Spence Eq. Jurisd. 580, section 2.
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it have been able to provide for " foundations" in cases of charities;
to require investments to be made; to decree the performance of
the varied trusts which might be established, or to remove any
obstacles which stood in the way. An illustration may be found
in the case of Attorney-General vs. La Roche.1 Money was
directed by a testator to be laid out in the purchase of land to the
use of A. for life, remainder to his first and other sons in tail,
remainder to a charity. A. having died, his widow feigned preg-
nancy. The Master of the Rolls made an order in the nature of a
writ de ventre inspiciendo, by means of which the fraud was disco-
vered, and the charity preserved. Had such a case arisen before
the statutes of Elizabeth, how persuasive would have been the
Lord Chancellor's maxim enunciated in the reign of Henry VII.,
" that no one shall depart from the Chancery without a remedy."
The only remaining inquiry is whether the proceeding by in-
formation existed. There appears to be no reason against it.
Legacies of a charitable nature were enforced on behalf of unin-
corporated bodies against the executors. Wherever they assumed
the character of trusts, they could be established by the Court as
such. "An executor is a trustee for the legatee with respect to
his legacy, and this is the only reason why he is liable in equity." 2
The king could use the process of information in trusts of p'rsonal
as well as of real estate. It is said by Lord Hale, that when a
trust of chattels is forfeited to the king, it may be executed by
information in the Exchequer or in Chancery.3 Wherever the
heir would be held a trustee for a charity in cases of real estate,
the executor would be deemed to sustain the same character in the
case of personal property. The position of the executor differed
from that of the heir in this respect; that where no specific
directions were given, he held under a "general trust" to dispend
for the soul. The jurisdiction over this latter class of cases ceased
after statutes had directed the residuum to be distributed among
1 2 P. Wins. 591 ; Mosely R. 191.
2 Ward vs. Jekyl, 2 P. Wms. 575.
3 1 Hale's Pleas of the Crown, 248. This passage serves to explain Porter's
Case, before alluded to. The king had his choice of remedies.
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the next of kin. There are instances of the enforcement of such
general trusts by Chancery in behalf of charities as late as the
reign of-James .' The Court of Chancery, in exercising jurisdic-
tion over executors, adopted the rules prevailing in the Eccle-
siastical Courts.2
It is not necessary to show that the present jurisdiction of
Chancery was then fully developed. It is enough if the germ
existed from which these doctrines are properly derived. No
subject of Chancery jurisdiction was then followed to its legitimate
consequences. From what we possess we may infer the residue
as an artist " makes out a statue from an existing torso, or an
anatomist constructs a perfect skeleton from the fossil remains of
a part."
On the whole, the opinion of Mr. Hargrave must be acceded to,
that the right to prove a will in the Ecclesiastical Court is exclu-
sive; jurisdiction to enforce its provisions is concurrent with
Chancery.
3
The imperfect survey taken of this subject may lead to the
conclusion that a more exhaustive research into the early autho-
rities than was possible in the preparation of these articles, would
show that'no class of men have been more truly charitable than
those rude men, as we are apt to term them, who lived in the
middle ages. It has recently been observed by competent autho-
rity, that " the objects of ancient bounty comprised every institu-
tion felt to be necessary or beneficial, or capable of relieving the
public burdens. They included establishments for instruction,
spiritual and secular; endowments to make and maintain cause-
ways, roads and bridges; for assisting the people in the charge
of fifteenths and other taxes; for providing arms for the general
defence, hospitals for the cure of disease, and for contributing to
the support of the poor in every form.
' 4
T.W. D.
I Tothill, 150-1. 6 Jac. 1.
2 Keily vs. Monck, 3 Ridgway P. C. 243; 1 Spence Eq. Jurisd. 582.
S Hargrave's Law Tracts, 473.
4 Report of the Committee of the Society for the Amendment of the Law, 11th
London Law Magazine, 305.
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[The later authorities have not been specially noticed, because,
from the character of these articles, it was mainly desirable to
state the results arrived at by historic investigation. For similar
reasons, local statutes have not been alluded to. Attention is
invited to the very learned and elaborate argument of Hon.
Alexander W. Bradford, former Surrogate of the city and county
of New York, in the case of Bose vs. Bose, Supreme Court of New
York. Mr. Bradford's great acquaintance with the civil law gives
his researches into the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts,
especial value. See also the argument of Edward 0. Parry, Esq.,
in the case of the reirs of Stephen Girard against the City of
Philadelphia, recently tried in the Court of Common Pleas,
Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania. Mr. Parry claimed that where
the devise or gift to a charity was in terms inalienable, so as to
take away from the Chancellor the power to order a sale in his
discretion, it came within the policy of the law as to perpetuities,
and was void.
The following are important legal decisions: Sonley vs. Clock-
makers' Co., 1 Brown Ch. Cas. 81; Incorporated Society vs.
Richards, 1 Drury & Warren 301; Will of Sarah Zane, Brightly's
Rep. 346 ; Tappan vs. -Deblois, 45 Maine 122 ; Baptist Association
vs. Hart, 4 Wheat. 1; -Dutch Church vs. Mott, 7 Paige 80;
Williams vs. Williams, 4 Selden 524; .ontain vs. Bavenel, 17
How. U. S. 369; Owens vs. Methodist Episcopal Church, 4 Kernan
380; Beekman vs. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. (9 Smith) 298. The argument
of Mr. Noyes in this case, previously mentioned, will be found in
the Appendix to the volume, p. 575, et seq.
The investigation of this subject leads to the conclusion, that
the obscurity of the law should be removed by legislation. There
is a disposition in England to place the subject on more satisfactory
grounds. There is an evident reaction against the policy of the
Mortmain Acts, which tended to discourage charitable donations.
A valuable report has recently been made by the Committee of the
Society for promoting Amendments of the Law. The following
wise suggestions were made by the Committee: 1. That hereafter
no land should be acquired by a charity, except so far as was
